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Abstract 
Codetermination can be regarded as an exogenously determined intervention which possibly 
affects efficiency of production and bargaining power of labor. Based on a model which 
covers efficient bargaining as well as employment bargaining a simple equation is derived 
which is suited to empirical testing. The empirical test is based on German data and includes 
years before and after the extension of German codetermination law in 1976. The estimates 
determine productivity of labor and relative bargaining power of capital and labor. It turns out 
that codetermination does not reduce productivity, but leads to an increase in workers’ 
bargaining power by about 7.4-7.9 percent.   
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I Introduction 
Labor markets are in all developed countries characterized by regulation through laws and 
institutions (Botero et al. 2004). These state interventions include labor law, collective 
bargaining laws as well as institutions, and social security regulation like unemployment 
benefits. Perotti and Thadden (2006) note that labor market institutions like corporate 
governance structure are shaped by political decisions and these decisions in turn are 
influenced by interests of the voters. Once established, corporate governance institutions 
affect decision making and determine (positively or negatively) rent creation as well as 
distribution. The topic of this contribution is the impact of a politically mandated change in 
corporate governance in Germany, namely codetermination, on productive efficiency of firms 
and the distribution of rents.  
Bargaining between labor and capital is the topic of many articles on labor economics1. The 
bargaining power of labor is among other factors determined by the legal framework. In 
Germany legislation has granted specific rights to labor on plant (Works Constitution Act) 
and company level (Codetermination Act). Codetermination is realized by equal 
representation of worker representatives on supervisory boards2. This gives the workforce 
explicit rights in discourse and decision-making at the highest company level, including the 
appointment of executives and contract renewal. This article focuses on the effect of 
codetermination on productivity and bargaining power of labor. 
Over the last years many articles have been written on codetermination with quite 
controversial results3. Besides the theoretical papers, some empirical studies have attempted 
to shed light on the effects of this institution (Svejnar 1982, FitzRoy and Kraft 1993, 2005, 
Kraft and Ugarkovic 2006, Gorton and Schmid 2004, Fauver and Fuerst 2006). Productivity, 
profits, stock returns, wages and employment adjustment are among the topics analyzed. 
However, an explicit bargaining model is not usually applied to estimate the relative 
                                            
1 Cf. for a survey Lawson (2011). 
2 Aside of Germany several other European countries have adopted employee representation at board level. 
These countries are Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic (however new legislation makes this optional from 
2014 onwards), Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Sweden  http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-
Representation2 
3 Addison (2009) provides a very detailed survey on all aspects (theoretical and empirical) of plant and company 
codetermination. Among the more recent contributions, Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2014) present a theoretical 
model on the effects of a representation of the interests of stakeholder like employees and suppliers in the firm’s 
decision making process. See also Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) for a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of 
diverse corporate boards.   
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bargaining power of the two parties and to identify the impact of codetermination (as well as 
other determinants) on the distribution of rents.   
The problems stem on the one hand from the theoretical basis and on the other hand from the 
empirical application. The modeling of bargaining processes is complex if the theoretical 
model is to be suitable for empirical application. Here a theoretical model is developed to 
derive a very simple structural equation on the relative bargaining power of labor that is 
suitable for an empirical test. This test is subsequently carried out using information from 154 
stock companies operating in the manufacturing industry in the years 1971 to 1990. It is 
therefore possible to cover time periods before and after the introduction of (quasi-) parity on 
the supervisory boards following the extension of Germany’s codetermination law in 1976. 
Codetermination takes place at the supervisory board level, with this board discussing and 
deciding on many strategic decisions like market development as well as on medium to long-
term corporate planning like organization of production or innovation activities. These 
decisions have relevance on the one hand for productivity of the firms and on the other hand 
for division of the surplus between labor and capital (Kraft 1998, 2001). Therefore the 
significant extension of codetermination rights in 1976 might well affect efficiency of the 
organizations and bargaining power of labor.   
I use an efficient bargaining model that takes account of simultaneous negotiations on wages 
and employment. A structural equation is derived which is subsequently used for the 
estimation of bargaining power in codetermined and non-codetermined firms. This structural 
model can also deal with pure employment bargaining.  
The equation explains the wage-bill-to-sales ratio as a simple function of the labor elasticity 
of output and bargaining power. Hence productivity of labor is compared with its share in 
output. Bargaining power is identified as an add-on to the labor elasticity of output.  
In the first place a production function is used to estimate the output elasticity of labor. This 
approach finds no productivity disadvantage of codetermined firms. Subsequently the output 
elasticity of labor is inserted into a non-linear equation explaining the wage-bill-to-sales ratio 
by variables like unionization, unemployment and codetermination to identify bargaining 
power. The study shows that the extension of codetermination rights has increased bargaining 
power of labor by about 7.4-7.9 percent. This study points to significant effects of collective 
bargaining laws or more general regulation of labor (Botero et al. 2004) on distribution of 
returns.  
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There are not many studies available which actually apply a bargaining framework and 
confront a structural model with empirical data. Svejnar (1986) develops and estimates a 
bargaining model which is subsequently applied to U.S. data. Veugelers (1989) determines 
empirically bargaining power in Belgian industries. Bughin (1996) estimates a bargaining 
model by use of Belgian data to simultaneously identify product market power of firms and 
union bargaining power. Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2010) estimate a quite general model, 
which allows to identify product and labor market imperfections, as well as right-to-manage 
versus efficient bargaining. Hirsch and Schnabel (2014) introduce an alternative approach to 
identify the bargaining power of unions in Germany by considering the labor share, net wage, 
average unemployment duration and worker’s discount rate.  
Based on less explicit modelling, bargaining power is estimated by some empirical studies. 
Using Canadian data, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) show that wages are higher in firms with 
limited pressure from international competition. Van Reenen (1996) determines the extent of 
rent sharing due to technological innovation. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) find that 30% of 
rents go to the employees and van Reenen (1996) estimates an elasticity between wages and 
quasi rents of 29%. Other relevant studies in this context are Cristofides and Oswald (1991), 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfrey (1996). 
This paper is organized as follows: firstly I describe in section 2 the institutional background 
of the German Codetermination Act. Section 3 contains a theoretical model that is then used 
in an empirical application. Section 4 reports the results of our empirical study. Finally, with 
section 6 I draw conclusions. 
 
2 Institutional Details 
German stock companies and large non-traded firms with limited liability (GmbHs) are 
managed and controlled by a two-tier system: the management board (Vorstand) on the one 
hand and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) on the other. 
In Germany, several kinds of codetermination laws exist4. Employees are able to adopt works 
councils on establishment level5. On the company level three codetermination laws are 
                                            
4 McGaughey (2015) presents a historical view on the development of codetermination in Germany. 
5 Starting with FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987), the effects of works councils have been the subject of a number 
of studies.  
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relevant6. The present study focuses on the extension of the Codetermination law which was 
introduced in 1951 and significantly extended in 1976 by introducing (quasi-) parity between 
representatives of labor and capital on the supervisory boards if companies employ 2000 
employees or more7. The enlargement was legislated by the social-liberal (Social Democratic 
Party and Free Democratic Party) coalition governing in Germany from 1969 to 1982 led by 
chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. Perotti and Thadden (2006) mention this 
intervention into corporate governance structure as the most pronounced incarnation of the 
attempt to let labor influence decision making. 
The members of the supervisory boards are representatives of capital owners and employees. 
In such organizations since 1977 representatives from labor and capital have an equal number 
of seats on the supervisory boards. Nevertheless, in case of dispute the head of the supervisory 
board, appointed by the capital owners, has two votes. Therefore the term quasi-parity is used 
for this kind of codetermination. However, in practice disputes are rather rare. 
The management boards lead companies and decide on all day-to-day business, but they have 
to report to the supervisory board about all important issues. Major decisions must be 
approved by the supervisory board. What exactly has to be fixed by the supervisory boards is 
usually determined by a list of approvable operations. This list can be divided into operational 
reporting and strategic decisions. 
Operational reporting covers, among other things, information from the supervisory board 
about market conditions (sales, market share), employment (number of employees, costs, 
working time, productivity, turnover), production (production volume, inventories, material 
costs, capacity, innovation policy), finance (debt, equity, leverage, investment), and 
profitability (cash flow, profits, return on investment, liquidity). Strategic decisions with a 
medium to long-term relevance encompass market development (technology, general trends 
in the main industry, the economy and foreign markets), medium to long-term corporate 
planning (strategy, research and development, human resources, production, finance, forecasts 
                                            
6 The other two are relevant for the coal, iron and steel industry on the one hand and for companies with between 
500 and 1999 employees on the other. In the former case codetermination rights are actually somewhat stronger, 
but only a limited number of firms are affected by this regulation. In the latter case representatives of labor 
occupy one third of the seats on the supervisory boards. Unfortunately it is much more difficult to identify the 
companies covered than in the case of quasi-parity codetermination, since no reliable list on the codetermined 
companies is available (and conglomerates are a frequent problem). 
7 The employment limit is relevant to the company alone or, if it is a conglomerate or the company has 
subsidiaries, the total number of employees is decisive.  
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concerning sales volume and profits). Employment is therefore directly and indirectly affected 
by short- and long-term decision making. 
Supervisory boards appoint the executives, and decide on contract renewals. A subcommittee 
of this board also determines the salaries of the top managers and the composition of 
remuneration in terms of fixed versus short- and long-term parts.   
In contrast to most other bargaining institutions, supervisory boards may well have a larger 
impact, directly or indirectly, on employment than on wages8. However, wages might also be 
affected indirectly.  
In Germany wage determination is basically a two-step process. Firstly, wage negotiations 
between employer associations and unions take place on industry level. Nevertheless, it has 
been shown that wages differ among firms, as the industry-wide agreement is frequently a 
substitute for a minimum wage, and wages are fixed on the firm or establishment level in a 
second round9. Codetermination might affect remuneration indirectly, e.g. by exerting 
resistance against wage concessions in cases of economically adverse situations10 . Svejnar 
(1982) presents evidence that the introduction of codetermination has led to a wage increase 
in the iron and steel industry, but not in the coal mining industry.  
 
 3 A Bargaining Model 
The utility function is based on risk neutral agents and is specified as wage differentials 
between remuneration in the considered firm (called w) in relation to wages earned elsewhere 
(outside option called aw ) multiplied by the number of employees N. The monetary value of 
the outside option is either unemployment benefits or a weighted average of a) employment at 
                                            
8 Cf. Kraft (1998, 2001). 
9 Note that in Germany firms are not forced to adopt collective agreements. In principle, every firm can choose 
between being a member of an employer association and setting wages through collective agreements or staying 
out of the employer association and setting wages individually. 
10 Gorton and Schmid (2004, 865) argue that employees might use codetermination as an insurance mechanism 
by resisting wage cuts and dismissals in recessions. In the case of a negative shock, employers might possibly 
seek to make some workers redundant. Codetermination could be used to resist to such demands, so a delay in 
redundancies is at least plausible. As Gorton and Schmid (2004) note, the codetermined firms would then tend to 
be overstaffed. This should also be reflected in the wage share if codetermined firms are compared with others. 
Codetermination as an insurance mechanism is also discussed by Perotti and Thadden (2006) as well as by Kim, 
Maug and Schneider (2015). Guertzgen (2014) presents related empirical evidence and shows that firms with 
works councils provide more wage insurance than other firms.  
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a lower wage level and b) unemployment benefits where the weights are determined by the 
probabilities that the first or the second option applies. This monetary value is called aw and 
its value determines the lower boundary for the bargained wage w. Hence, the aim of labor is 
to maximize the function  
(2) ( )aU N w w= −  
This is the well-known Stone-Geary utility function with risk-neutral workers and is 
frequently applied in bargaining models (examples are Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfy 1996 
and Dobbelaere 2004).  
The firm simply maximizes profits by use of three production factors: labor N, capital K and 
materials M. Workers receive the wage w, whilst interest rates relevant for the use of capital 
are denoted by r and material costs are called c. To keep the model manageable, capital and 
materials are assumed to be exogenously determined and fixed in the short run. Profits are 
defined as the difference between sales volume Pq and costs for labor wN, capital rK and 
materials cM .  
(3) ( , , )Pq K N M wN rK cM− − −  
Output is determined by a simple Cobb Douglas production function: q N K Mα β γ= with the 
labor elasticity of output α , capital elasticity of output β  , output elasticity of materials γ   
and firms maximize (as usual) profits. In case of dispute they have to bear the expenditures 
for capital and material11. I consider the realistic case of asymmetric bargaining power, and 
the bargaining power of the two players is denoted by φ  and 1 φ− . The aims of the two 
parties are combined by the well-known Nash bargaining solution: 
(4) (1 )( ( )) ( ( ))aN w w PN K M wN rK cM rK cM
φ α β γ φ−Φ = − − − − − − −  
In case of efficient bargaining the Nash product is optimized with respect to employment and 
wages. This leads to the following derivatives: 
(5) ( )PqN
w
φ α φα+ −
=  
(6) a aPq nw n ww
n
φ φ+ +
=  
                                            
11 This assumption is frequently made in the literature, examples being Bughin (1996), Crepon et al. (1999), 
Dobbelaere (2004) Abraham et al.(2009).  
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Solving these relations yields a simple relation for employment: 
(7) 
a
PqN
w
α
=  
Employment is determined by the labor elasticity of output and the alternative wage. Hence in 
this case employment is at its maximum. A similar expression for the wage leads to: 
(8) ( ) aw w
φ α φα
α
+ −
=  
These two equations can be combined to determine an expression for the wage-bill-to-sales 
ratio 
(9) nw
Pq
φ α φα= + −  
In this case the wage-bill-to-sales ratio is a simple function of the output elasticity and 
bargaining power. Interestingly it is independent of the alternative wage aw . The ratio of total 
wage payments to sales is a popular measure for labor’s bargaining power and is also applied 
in empirical studies (e.g. by Gorton and Schmid 2004). This procedure is supported by our 
simple model, where this ratio is actually determined by bargaining power (and productivity). 
If the simple textbook model applies and workers have no bargaining power ( 0φ = ) the 
wage-bill-to-sales ratio reduces to the output elasticity of labor.  
As already discussed above, the question arises whether a model based on efficient bargaining 
is really adequate for analyzing codetermination, as wages are rarely an explicit issue for 
supervisory boards12. Interestingly it is rather simple to include pure employment bargaining. 
Rearranging the optimality condition for employment bargaining (5), leads exactly to 
equation (9). Hence, with respect to equation (9), it doesn’t matter whether wages and 
employment are determined in negotiations simultaneously or whether employment only is 
negotiated.  
The relevance of equation (9) for efficient as well as employment bargaining is clearly 
advantageous, as other determinants of the outcome of bargaining are not based on 
employment bargaining only. Note, however pure, wage negotiations are not covered by this 
model.  
                                            
12 Cleary wages might be an implicit issue and there are specific situations possible like concession bargaining in 
the case of severe crisis.  
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Imperfect competition 
Monopolistic Competition 
Until now prices are exogenously determined and not a function of the output produced by the 
firm in question. This is true for competitive markets but in many situations imperfect 
competition is more realistic. A simple way to consider such a situation is by including 
monopolistic competition13. Demand for output q is determined in the following way:  
(10) , 1D P Yη η= < −  
With Y being a general demand factor and η  stands for the price elasticity of demand. 
Inverting this relation leads to an equation for price: 
(11) 1, 1 0P D Yε ε ε η− −= − < = <  
Inventory holding is disregarded here and therefore D q=  
Combining these relations together with the production function implies  
(12) (1 )( M )q N K Yα β γ ε ε+ −=  
The bargaining function is now 
(13) (1 ) (1 )( ( )) (( M ) ( ))aN w w N K Y wN rK cM rK cM
φ α β γ ε ε φ+ − −Φ = − − − − − − −  
Optimization leads to somewhat more complicated expressions which, however, are 
interpreted very similarly to the relations determined earlier: 
(14) (1 )
(1 ) a
w wφ α ε φ φε
α ε
+ + − −
=
+
 
(15) (1 )
a
PqN
w
ε α+
=  
Employment again depends on the alternative wage, output elasticity and sales. It comes as no 
surprise that due to 0ε <  employment is lower than in the case of perfect competition.  
The expressions for wage and employment can be used to explain the wage-bill-to-sales ratio 
(16) (1 ) (1 )wN
Pq
φ α ε φα ε= + + − +
 
                                            
13 Many papers use a monopolistic competitive framework. Very well-known examples are Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) as well as Blanchard and Kyotaki (1987) 
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During the estimation process to be explained below, the output elasticity of labor and the 
expression for demand elasticity are always simultaneously determined.  
 
Cournot Oligopoly 
As it is well known, in a Cournot model the marginal revenue function depends on output: 
(17) ( )i iPq P Q q= ; with 
 
1
n
i
i
Q q
=
= ∑ and 
 
( )i
i
i i i
Pq Q P QP q
q q Q q
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
The derivative of sales with respect to employment is now 
(18) i i i i
i i
Pq Q q P Q qP q
N q N Q q N
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
If the typical Cournot assumption 1
i
Q
q
∂
=
∂
is applied the expression from above reduces to 
(19) 
( ) ( )i ii
i
Pq P qP q
N q N
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Straightforward rearrangements lead to 
(20) ( ) (1 )i i iPq s qP
N Nη
∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂
. 
The term is stands for the individual market share and η represents the demand elasticity. 
Taking into account the Cobb-Douglas production function from above leads to the following 
relation 
(21) ( ) (1 )i i iPq s qP
N N
α
η
∂
= +
∂
 
Just to simplify notation, I introduce (1 )isa
η
= + . When the logarithmic Cobb-Douglas 
production function is estimated, not α is identified but  
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(22) 
ln( )
ln
iPq a
N
α
∂
=
∂
 
If this is taken up in the bargaining model the following relation for the wage-bill-to-sales 
ratio emerges: 
(23) wN a a
Pq
φ α φ α= + −  
The upshot of the consideration of these two simple models of imperfect competition is that in 
principle the bargaining model is not affected. The estimated production elasticities are 
determined somewhat differently, but this has no effect on the analysis of the distribution 
process.  
 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data 
The empirical model is based on a difference-in-differences approach. The extended 
codetermination law became effective in 1976 but the firms were granted a transition period 
until 1978 to install supervisory boards with a new allocation of the seats. The empirical test 
is based on data from stock companies from 1971 to 1990. The advantage of this particular 
data source is the coverage of periods before and after the major extension of the 
codetermination laws in 1976.  
This test is based on an unbalanced panel of 154 firms from the manufacturing sector which 
are observed for six periods before (1971 to 1976) and 11 years (1980 to 1990) after the 
introduction of the extended codetermination law14. The years 1977 to 1979 are omitted 
because of the mentioned transition periods for installing the newly introduced supervisory 
boards. Furthermore, adjustment problems might contaminate the “true” effects of 
codetermination. This leads to a total of 2145 observations if a fixed effects model is applied 
and to 1803 observations in the case of system GMM15. 
                                            
14 The origin of the data is the German Finance Data Base (Deutsche Finanzdatenbank/ 
Jahresabschlussdatenbank), which was extended Hoppenstedt’s Handbook of German Corporations (Handbuch 
der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften) as well as from the annual statements of accounts. 
15 In Germany the number of stock companies is generally smaller than for example in the U.S. Furthermore, 
only companies from the manufacturing sector are considered, whilst firms from the steel and iron producing 
industry are excluded, since they are subject to the specific and somewhat stronger codetermination law in the 
coal, iron and steel industry 
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4.2 Estimation of a Production Function 
The empirical test is implemented in two steps. In the first place a simple Cobb-Douglas 
production function is estimated. The estimation is based on the use of capital, labor and 
material costs as explanatory variables. The dependent variable is sales volume. Sales, capital 
and materials are divided by the relevant industry-specific producer price index. The 
coefficients of the production factors stand for the output elasticities if perfect competition 
applies, or additionally reflect effects of product differentiation by including 1 ε+  or 
oligopoly markups by the additional factor (1 )isa
η
= + .  
Fixed effects model 
The estimation of the production function is based on a fixed effect panel model. Time 
dummies are also included. In principle it would be desirable to identify separate estimates of 
α for every single firm. However in practice the limited number of observations per firm does 
not allow a consistent identification of the individual production elasticities (in particular in a 
fixed effects model). However, some differentiation and disaggregation is still possible: Labor 
is differentiated according to employment in non-codetermined firms, employment in 
codetermination firms in periods before the enlargement became effective (1971 respectively 
1973 in case of GMM until 1976) and employment in codetermined firms after the 
enlargement became effective from 1980 onwards. Three different (broadly defined) 
industries are also distinguished to take account of specific technological conditions. The 
industries are: production of consumer goods, production of industrial goods and investment 
and production of durable goods. Clearly, the intention is to take account of possible 
productivity differences which should be reflected in the share of output that goes to labor.  
The results are shown in table 1. Note that these results are based on the estimation of one 
regression in which differences between codetermined and non-codetermined firms and 
among industries are modeled by interactions. As an additional covariate the six firm 
concentration index is included. The intention is to take account of price effects of imperfect 
competition, which could be reflected in higher revenues.  
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The coefficients have reasonable magnitudes, but for two industries (investment goods and 
industrial and durable goods) the performed Wald tests reject the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale, which is not an unusual result in fixed effects models16.  
Comparing the codetermined firms before and after the enlargement of the law, this 
enlargement leads to somewhat higher output elasticities of labor. In the case of investment 
and durable goods industry the differences are significant. This shows that codetermination 
does not reduce efficiency as sometimes supposed.   
Table 1: Fixed-Effects Regression with log of Sales as Dependent Variable 
Independent variables Consumer goods Industrial goods 
Investment and 
durable goods 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination. = 
0)  
    0.256*** 
(0.035) 
    0.204*** 
(0.031) 
    0.223*** 
(0.027) 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination 
before 1976) 
0.248*** 
(0.035) 
0.210*** 
(0.031) 
0.228*** 
(0.026) 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination 
after 1976) 
    0.251*** 
(0.036) 
    0.213*** 
(0.032) 
    0.232*** 
(0.026) 
Ln (Material costs)     0.650*** 
(0.029) 
    0.61*** 
(0.039) 
    0.652*** 
(0.019) 
Ln (Capital) 0.089*** 
(0.023) 
0.099*** 
(0.035) 
0.070*** 
(0.020) 
Concentration    0.003** 
(0.001) 
    0.003** 
(0.001) 
    0.003** 
(0.011) 
No of obs. 2145 
R2 0.98 
Notes: ***/** indicates statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level. Time dummies are included but not 
reported. Parentheses contain robust and clustered standard errors. Clustering takes place at firm level. 
 
 
 
                                            
16 As a robustness check I also experimented with lagged values of the production factors. This did not change 
the insights. 
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Dynamic system-GMM panel model 
The fixed effects model addresses time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity like management 
quality, which may bias the results if this unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with other 
variables. However, there might also feed-back effects be present like demand shocks which 
affect output and input factor simultaneously. To cope with time-invariant fixed effects and 
possible endogeneity problems in addition a system-GMM model is used. The system GMM 
estimator combines time differencing of the variables with instrumenting endogenous 
variables by lagged levels and differences of these covariates. Necessary conditions for 
validity of this approach are absence of second order autocorrelation in the differenced errors 
(Arellano-Bond test) and the validity of the overidentification moment conditions in the 
presence of robust standard errors (Hansen J test). The model is dynamic and includes the 
lagged dependent variable. The two-step estimator is used, the standard errors are clustered 
and the Windmejjer (2005) finite sample correction of the standard errors is applied.  
Endogenous variables are the production factors labor, capital and material. Predetermined is 
concentration. Because of the weak instrument problem not all possible lags are used, but just 
the lags from t-2 and  t-3. Table 2 presents the result of the system GMM estimations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 Table 2: Dynamic System GMM with log of Sales as Dependent Variable 
Independent variables Consumer goods Industrial goods 
Investment and 
durable goods 
lnSales(t-1) .211*** 
(0.037) 
.211*** 
(0.037) 
0.211*** 
(0.037) 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination. = 
0)  
    0.138*** 
(0.027) 
    0.150*** 
(0.030) 
    0.183*** 
(0.027) 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination 
before 1976) 
0.140*** 
(0.025) 
0.145*** 
(0.028) 
0.179*** 
(0.026) 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination 
=after 1976) 
    0.143*** 
(0.025) 
    0.148*** 
(0.029) 
    0.180*** 
(0.026) 
Ln (Material costs)     0.540*** 
(0.039) 
    0.48*** 
(0.038) 
    0.502*** 
(0.038) 
Ln (Capital) 0.085*** 
(0.028) 
0.146*** 
(0.036) 
0.104** 
(0.027) 
Concentration  0.0004 
(0.001) 
 0.004 
(0.001) 
 0.004 
(0.001) 
No of obs. 1803 
Number of instruments 354 
Arellano-Bond test on AR(2) in first differences  p=.817 
Hansen J Test on overidentifying restrictions p=.846 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. All results are two-step system GMM estimates. 
Time dummies are included but not reported. Parentheses contain clustered standard errors which are based on 
the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005). Clustering takes place at firm level. 
 
Returns to scale are tested by Wald tests on a restricted model with lnSales(t-1)=0. Results 
are presented in table (3) below. Constant returns are now only rejected in one case: 
codetermined firms before the enlargement of the law active in the industrial goods industry. 
No significant differences between the coefficients of the output elasticities of labor are 
estimated.  
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Table 3: Restricted System GMM with log of Sales as Dependent Variable without 
lagged dependent variable 
Independent variables Consumer goods Industrial goods 
Investment and 
durable goods 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination. = 
0)  
    0.193*** 
(0.05) 
    0.185*** 
(0.041) 
    0.247*** 
(0.031) 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination 
before 1976) 
0.194*** 
(0.043) 
0.179*** 
(0.034) 
0.240*** 
(0.032) 
Ln (Labor) (codetermination 
=after 1976) 
    0.195*** 
(0.052) 
    0.183*** 
(0.034) 
    0.240*** 
(0.033) 
Ln (Material costs)     0.644*** 
(0.057) 
    0.589*** 
(0.0334) 
    0.617*** 
(0.043) 
Ln (Capital) 0.129*** 
(0.047) 
0.202*** 
(0.040) 
0.133** 
(0.041) 
Concentration  0.0006 
(0.001) 
 0.006 
(0.001) 
 0.006 
(0.001) 
No of obs. 1803 
Number of instruments 328 
Arellano-Bond test on AR(2) in first differences  p=.189 
Hansen J Test on overidentifying restrictions p=.769 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. All results are two-step system GMM estimates. 
Time dummies are included but not reported. Parentheses contain clustered standard errors which are based on 
the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005). Clustering takes place at firm level. 
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4.3 Determinants of Bargaining Power 
Equations (9) and (16) are non-linear relations between bargaining power, output elasticity of 
labor, inverse of price elasticity, bargaining power φ  and the wage bill to sales ratio. 
Bargaining power in turn is empirically identified by some economic variables. In particular 
the following relation is used  
(24) 0 1 2 i i t tCODAL CODEFF Z Tφ γ γ γ β t= + + + +  
In the next step the coefficients of the variables lnemployment (the different values of α  
respectively (1 )α ε+ ) are used in a non-linear least square estimation. The main interest is 
clearly the determination of possible bargaining effects exerted by the extension of 
codetermination rights. As usual in difference-in-differences models of this kind the most 
important variable enters the equation twice: the variable CODAL has unit value for 
codetermined firms for all years, whereas CODEFF has unit value if codetermination is 
effectively at work. This means the firms are codetermined and the time periods considered 
are the years from 1980 onwards. Hence the marginal effect of CODEFF 2( )γ  is the 
interesting parameter. iZ  stands for a number of covariates to be explained below and the tT  
variables represent time dummies.  
Puhani (2012) discusses the identification and estimation of treatment effects in non-linear 
difference-in-differences models and suggests using the difference in the expected value if the 
relevant variable assumes the values zero and one (similarly to the estimation of marginal 
effects in the case of dummy variables). I follow this suggestion. 
Time dummies are also included within the bargaining equation. Furthermore 17 two-digit 
industry dummy-variables jI are added, but outside of the bargaining equation
17. The 
industry-dummies identify the coefficients jδ . The equation to be estimated now looks like 
this: 
(25)  0 1 2
0 1 2
ln ( )
( )
i i i i t t
i
i i i i t t j j
wN CODAL CODEFF Z T
Pq
CODAL CODEFF Z T I
γ γ γ β t α
γ γ γ β t α δ
 
= + + + + + 
 
− + + + + +
 
                                            
17 Including them in the bargaining equation implies a somewhat different assumption concerning the 
determination of bargaining power, but this does not alter the results.  
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This equation is estimated by non-linear least squares. The dependent variable is specified as 
a logarithmic value. In the case of a logarithmic dependent variable the interpretation of the 
coefficients is quite straightforward as a relative impact. Hence the marginal effect of 
CODEFF tells us to what extent bargaining power has increased (or decreased or has not been 
affected by the extension of the codetermination law). The effect of codetermination will be 
exactly measured as 𝑒𝑒𝜔𝜔 − 1  with 𝜔𝜔 being the estimated value of the treatment effect.  In the 
given context a specification which identifies the relative impact o codetermination on 
bargaining power appears to be quite useful.  
The use of accounting firm data offers only limited access to useful covariates of potential 
interest. However, some interesting information can be obtained from other sources. Clearly 
working time is not constant over time and between firms, and hours in turn will affect the 
wage bill. Data on overtime hours per employee is published at industry level and this is used 
to represent the general state of demand in an industry.  
The skill levels of employees will in all likelihood affect wages directly due to productivity 
effects (remember firm-specific coefficients cannot be estimated) and may possibly also affect 
bargaining power. As a proxy variable I use the innovation intensity of a firm by computing 
the number of patents per employee (Patents per employee). Innovative firms usually employ 
better skilled workers and pay higher wages.  
It is sometimes argued that firms in concentrated industries employ better qualified workers 
and this in turn will affect the wage bill18. Another argument points into the opposite 
direction: Monopoly power reduces the labor share in output as prices rise due to a higher 
mark-up on costs, but wages do not (if concentration is not associated with higher 
unionism)19. This argument is also valid in this context if my output elasticities of labor are 
not disaggregated enough to take account of different market structures. Given that I only 
consider three broadly defined industries this might well be the case. Hence concentration 
might assume positive or negative values. The degree of imperfect competition is measured 
on the two-digit industry level as the six firm concentration ratio.    
Standard variables in bargaining models are unemployment and union density. 
Unemployment is available on the level of the German Bundesländer (10 Bundesländer 
                                            
18 Cf. Belman and Heywood (1990), who consider the interaction between concentration, innovation and 
qualification. 
19 Cf. e.g. Conyon (1994). 
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before the reunification) and included as a further control variable. Unionization can be 
computed in the following way: in Germany several industry unions exist. Computation of 
unionization is done in the following way: information is available on the number of union 
members, the industries for which they are responsible (this is usually more than just a single 
industry), and the number of employees in the relevant industries. On the basis of this 
information the share of unionized employees is computed. This is the gross rate of 
unionization and an upper estimate of unionization because some members of the unions are 
unemployed or retired. 
Union density is frequently regarded as a factor correlated with bargaining power and in the 
given context this is relevant in two ways. Firstly, bargaining power will most likely have an 
impact on the base level of wages, which (as explained earlier) is determined by negotiations 
taking place at industry level. Secondly, high unionization probably reflects the attitude of the 
workforce in general towards the representation of workers’ rights in bargaining processes. 
This in turn may be a good indicator of what workers expect from their representatives on the 
supervisory boards. These are frequently members of the works councils, who are elected 
every four years by the employees.  
Following Koenker and Hallock (2001) I adjust the continuous variables by subtracting from 
the observed value its respective mean value. This approach has the advantage that the 
constant term, in this case called centercept, can be interpreted as the mean bargaining power 
of non-codetermined firms with average values for overtime hours, innovation intensity 
concentration, union density and unemployment. It does not, in contrast to the classical 
intercept, express an out-of-sample prediction. 
The empirical model is basically a two stage procedure where production elasticities of labor 
are estimated in the first place. These estimates are used in the second step. In two stage 
approaches of this kind the conventional standard errors are not valid.  Therefore I use 
bootstrapping with cluster adjustment and 200 replications. Note, this bootstrapping is based 
on the inclusion of both parts of the estimation procedure for every bootstrap sample. 
The second stage nonlinear least square-estimations of the bargaining function are carried out 
two times using the respective output elasticity estimates of the production functions from the 
fixed effects and the system GMM regressions. The results based on output elasticities of 
labor from the fixed effects estimation are presented in table three. All specifications include 
time and 17 two-digit industry dummies. Column (1) is the preferred specification. Note,  
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Table 4: NLS Regression Results based on the fixed effects model 
 (1) (2) (3)  
Dep. Var Ln(Share of 
labor costs) 
Ln(Share of 
labor costs) 
Ln(Share of 
labor costs) 
 
Constant -1.653*** 
(0.091) 
-1.524*** 
(0.078) 
-1.415*** 
(0.075) 
 
 
CODAL 
 
[treatment. eff.] 
 
0.020 
(0.028) 
 
�
0.016(0.022)�  
 
0.022 
(0.028) 
 
�
−0.017(0.022)�  
 
-0.027 
(0.028) 
 
�
−0.021(0.022)� 
 
 
CODEFF  
 
[treatment. eff.] 
0.094*** 
(0.032) 
 
�
0.072 ∗∗∗(0.025) � 
0.092*** 
(0.032) 
 
�
0.071 ∗∗∗(0.025) � 
0.095*** 
(0.033) 
 
�
0.073∗∗∗(0.025) � 
 
 
Overtime hours 
.062*** 
(0.019) 
 0.059** 
(0.019) 
 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
 
Patents per 
employee*100 
0.071*** 
(0.014) 
0.072*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.070*** 
(0.014) 
 
Concentration 
 
Unemployment 
 
Ln(Unemployment) 
 
Unionization 
 
 
 
Time dummies 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.127*** 
(0.028) 
0.556*** 
(0.151) 
 
 
Yes 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.565*** 
 (0.151) 
 
 
       Yes 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
0.547*** 
(0.151) 
 
 
Yes 
 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes Yes  
No. of obs.           
 
         2145                
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%level.  Parentheses contain bootstrapped and clustered 
standard errors. Clustering takes place at firm level. Squared brackets contain the average marginal effects. 
Standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated by the delta method, they are bootstrapped and clustered. 
  --------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
unemployment enters the equation here as a logarithmic value. Column (3) presents the 
results with the non-logarithmized variable unemployment.  
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It might be argued that, if wages are high in general, a feedback effect from the wage bill to 
unemployment causes an endogeneity problem. IV methods are rather difficult in such non-
liner relations and a convincing instrument is not available. Therefore in one specification 
(presented in column 2) this variable is simply excluded. This omission does not alter the 
main results20. 
The results point to a significant effect of the extension of the codetermination rights on the 
wage-bill-to-sales ratio. As the productivity effect is included by the output elasticity, the 
results point to a redistribution effect beyond productivity. Hence, according to the outcome 
of the applied model, the extension of the codetermination law has had an impact on 
bargaining power.  
Next, the NLS-estimations are repeated by use of the output elasticities of labor computed by 
system GMM. The results are presented in table 4. The result concerning the enlargement of 
codetermination are just a little bit above those reported in table 3 and are surprisingly close 
to those shown in table three. Applying the transformation 𝑒𝑒𝜔𝜔 − 1 to all presented marginal 
effects in the two tables, the increase in bargaining power is  within a range of 7.4-7.9%. The 
constant term stands for the average bargaining power (in the base industry) in firms without 
codetermination. However, the codetermination law had no impact on bargaining power 
before its extension and therefore the estimate  𝑒𝑒𝛾𝛾0 (𝛾𝛾0 is the constant term) stands for the 
bargaining power in both firm types. This points to an average bargaining power of about 
0.22-0.27, which does not look unrealistic. 
The included control variables display the expected signs and are significant. Average 
overtime at industry level raises the wage-bill-to-sales ratio. Similarly innovative firms have a 
higher wage-bill-to-sales ratio, which is presumably explained by the employment of better 
skilled and better paid employees. Employees of firms active in highly concentrated industries 
receive a larger share of sales. Unemployment reduces the labor share, while union density 
increases it. Hence the control variables work in the expected way.  
 
 
                                            
20  The variables overtime hours, concentration and patent might determine the rent to a larger extent than 
bargaining power. As the dependent variable is a ratio with sales volume in the denominator, this is probably of 
limited relevance. Nevertheless, an equation with no covariates except unionization is estimated. The marginal 
effect of codetermination loses some of its significance, but the effect is close to the one reported in the other 
columns.  
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Table 5: NLS Regression Results based on the system GMM model (column 1-3 dynamic 
GMM, column 4 restricted system GMM)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var Ln(Share of 
labor costs) 
Ln(Share of 
labor costs) 
Ln(Share of 
labor costs) 
Ln(Share of 
labor costs) 
Constant -1.509*** 
(0.078) 
-1.405*** 
(0.066) 
-1.30*** 
(0.062) 
   -1.509*** 
(0.072) 
 
CODAL 
 
[treatment eff.] 
 
0.031 
(0.030) 
 
�
0.024(0.032)�  
 
0.030 
(0.030) 
 
�
−0.024(0.023)�  
 
0.036 
(0.030) 
 
�
−0.028(0.024)� 
 
0.029 
(0.027) 
 
�
0.023(0.021)�  
 
CODEFF  
 
[treatment eff.] 
0.095*** 
(0.034) 
 
�
0.074 ∗∗∗(0.025) � 
0.095*** 
(0.034) 
 
�
0.074 ∗∗∗(0.026) � 
0.097*** 
(0.034) 
 
�
0.076∗∗∗(0.027) � 
0.096*** 
(0.031) 
 
�
0.075∗∗∗(0.024) � 
 
 
Overtime hours 
 
.007*** 
(.020) 
  
0.004*** 
(0.020) 
 
 
0.0004*** 
(0.0020) 
 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
Patents per 
employee*100 
0.091*** 
(0.017) 
0.091*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.090*** 
(0.017) 
0.083*** 
(0.013) 
Concentration 
 
Unemployment 
 
Ln(Unemployment) 
 
Unionization 
 
 
Time dummies 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
-0.122*** 
(0.029) 
0.300*** 
(0.150) 
 
Yes 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.305*** 
 (0.148) 
 
       Yes 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
0.286*** 
(0.149) 
 
Yes 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.120*** 
(0.026) 
0.210 
(0.141) 
 
Yes 
 
 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.           
 
         1803                
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%level.  Parentheses contain bootstrapped and clustered 
standard errors. Clustering takes place at firm level. Squared brackets contain the average marginal effects. 
Standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated by the delta method, they are bootstrapped and clustered. 
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This result is consistent with the estimations of Gorton and Schmid (2004), who explain 
logarithmic value of the ratio of employees to sales and the log ratio of the wage bill to sales 
by codetermination (and covariates). However, one difference to their study is the 
consideration of productivity effects. The empirical results of this study are also in accordance 
with the study of Petry (2015), who shows that the enlargement of codetermination led to a 
decline in shareholder wealth. Related evidence on the effect of labor unions as shareholders 
in the U.S. is presented by Agrawal (2012) and by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) on the impact of 
the imposition of a 40% quota of female members of the boards of directors of publicly listed 
firms in Norway. However, Ginglinger, Megginson and Waxin (2011) find no significant 
impact of the presence of directors elected by employees on firm value or profitability.  
 
5 Conclusion 
I use a simple bargaining model to derive a relation between the wage-bill-to-sales ratio and 
bargaining power as well as the output elasticity of labor. Bargaining power is identified by 
comparing the labor elasticity of output with the share of sales that goes to labor. The 
estimation of a production function by a within and a dynamic system GMM model produce 
rather similar results and do not point to productivity disadvantages of codetermined firms. 
The labor elasticity of output is subsequently inserted into the bargaining equation to identify 
determinants of bargaining power. Some standard control variables to determine bargaining 
power of labor like unemployment and unionization are included in addition. 
The bargaining equation is separately estimated on the basis of the within and the system 
GMM output elasticities. The results are in both cases pretty close. I find evidence for an 
increase in bargaining power by about 7.4-7.9 % related to the extension of the 
Codetermination Act in 1976. Summarizing, the extension of the codetermination law did not 
harm efficiency, as sometimes supposed, but it increases bargaining power of labor and 
affects the distribution of rents.   
Clearly the model is based on restrictive assumptions. On the other hand, it leads to a quite 
simple equation which can be empirically tested. Most likely the relation used to identify 
bargaining power is of relevance above the question of codetermination.  
In future work I intend to apply more general specifications. One extension might be a less 
restrictive production function. Another idea is to employ a utility function, which allows for 
risk aversion on the part of the employees. Moreover at the moment I ignore the second main 
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pillar of German industrial relations, the works councils. Works councils are active on the 
plant level, and it is quite likely that works council affect efficiency of production and 
bargaining power of labor. In contrast to codetermination on the company level, medium-
sized firms with less than 2000 employees frequently have works councils21 and it would be 
useful to compare their effects with that of codetermination. 
  
                                            
21 Works councils are not mandatory but the workforce must be allowed the option of establishing one. 
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